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Category: Economy & Switzerland

When a Country Drives Entrepreneurs Away, It Loses More Than Tax Revenue

Entrepreneurs are not walking tax bases. Wealth is not a social offence. And a country does not become richer by driving away the people who create prosperity.

Yet economic success is increasingly discussed as if it required political justification.

Those who own a lot should pay more. Those who have built a business should pay again when they pass it on to the next generation. Anyone who objects is quickly put on the defensive.

The liberal counter-question is: What does a country actually lose when successful entrepreneurs and wealthy families leave?

The answer is: far more than tax revenue.

Entrepreneurial wealth is not a pile of cash

The wealth of a family entrepreneur rarely sits in a bank account.

It is tied up in companies, factories, machinery, patents, inventories and shareholdings. It is equity. It absorbs losses, supports borrowing and finances investment.

A wealth tax therefore does not automatically tax disposable luxury. It can tax capital that is working inside a business.

Switzerland is one of the few OECD countries that still levies a general wealth tax. Holdings in unlisted companies are generally part of taxable wealth, although cantons apply different valuation and relief rules. The OECD explicitly points out that wealth taxes can create liquidity problems where assets are illiquid.

The problem is simple: Taxes have to be paid in cash. Company values do not necessarily consist of cash.

Someone who owns a business worth CHF 50 million does not automatically have CHF 50 million in liquidity.

That distinction is surprisingly often lost in political debate.

Taxes change behaviour

Switzerland can measure this.

A study published in the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy analysed differences between Swiss cantons. Its finding: when a cantonal wealth tax rate falls by one percentage point, declared taxable wealth rises by at least 43 per cent after six years.

The researchers attribute around 24 per cent of the effect to taxpayer mobility and around 21 per cent to rising property prices. For a significant part of the remaining effect, they find evidence of changes in reporting behaviour.

The key lesson is not that every wealthy person leaves a canton after a tax increase.

It is much simpler:

People respond to taxes.

So does capital.

That is why Swiss tax competition is more than a marketing tool for locations. Cantons are free to raise or lower taxes. But they also have to live with the economic consequences.

Power is constrained.

That is federalism in its most economic form.

Norway shows how mobile entrepreneurs have become

Norway increased wealth taxation from 2022 onwards and subsequently tightened dividend taxation as well. In particular, the government increased the valuation of shareholdings for wealth-tax purposes and introduced a higher rate for large fortunes.

In the same year, according to Norwegian population registers, at least 30 wealthy entrepreneurs and investors deregistered and moved abroad. Switzerland was one of the most popular destinations.

Norway subsequently tightened its exit-tax regime. The reforms were designed in particular to prevent unrealised gains accumulated while a person was subject to Norwegian taxation from permanently escaping Norwegian tax after emigration.

One can take different views on the tax policy.

But the economic message is difficult to ignore:

When a country needs rules to determine how much wealth can still be taxed when people leave, mobility is no longer a theoretical risk.

France shows that the cost is more complicated than a tax bill

Until 2017, France imposed a broad wealth tax known as the ISF.

According to France Stratégie, between 2011 and 2016 an average of around 370 wealth-tax households returned to France each year. Around 950 left.

After the ISF was replaced by the more narrowly focused real-estate wealth tax, the IFI, the picture changed. Between 2018 and 2021, an average of around 380 households returned each year, while only around 260 left. France Stratégie explicitly cautions against drawing a simple causal conclusion from these figures. At the same time, the reform came at a substantial cost in direct tax revenue. For 2022, the difference was estimated at around EUR 4.5 billion.

That is precisely why the usual debate is too narrow.

The relevant question is not:

How much tax does an entrepreneur pay this year?

It is:

Where will that entrepreneur’s capital be in ten years? Where will the next generation start businesses? Where will the next company be created? Where will investments be made? Where will the family office be based? Where will a foundation be established?

Those effects never appear fully in short-term tax statistics.

The United Kingdom provides the necessary counter-example

A liberal argument should take its counter-examples seriously.

In 2017, the United Kingdom tightened the rules for long-term resident non-doms. A later HMRC evaluation found that the reform did indeed lead to additional departures. Long-term non-doms affected by the reform were 10 to 12 per cent more likely to emigrate.

Most nevertheless stayed.

And those who stayed paid substantially more tax. HMRC estimates additional revenues of around GBP 1 billion in both 2018/19 and 2019/20 compared with a scenario without the reform.

That disproves one simplistic claim:

Higher taxes do not automatically lead to lower tax revenues.

But it does not prove that mobility is irrelevant.

Since 6 April 2025, the United Kingdom has operated a fundamentally different system. The previous remittance basis was replaced by a residence-based regime with a special four-year rule for qualifying new residents.

The fiscal balance can be measured.

The long-term effect on investment, company formation and location decisions will be far harder to quantify.

Germany shows what lies behind the label “the wealthy”

Public debate likes to talk abstractly about “the rich”.

The structure of German business shows how misleading that can be.

According to a ZEW study published in 2025, 88 per cent of private companies in Germany are family-controlled. They employ 18.3 million people, accounting for 58 per cent of all private-sector employees.

Behind large private fortunes there are therefore often no anonymous financial portfolios.

There are companies.

Jobs.

Factories.

Suppliers.

Apprenticeships.

And owners who carry responsibility for decades.

Anyone discussing the taxation of large fortunes should therefore at least ask what exactly is being taxed.

The JUSO initiative made the conflict visible

The Swiss initiative “For a Social Climate Policy – Tax-Financed Fairly” proposed a federal inheritance and gift tax of 50 per cent on the portion of an estate or gift exceeding CHF 50 million.

On 30 November 2025, 78.28 per cent of voters rejected the initiative. Not a single canton voted in favour.

The debate around large family-owned companies highlighted the central problem of any tax based on substance:

The value of a company is not the same as available liquidity.

A large tax bill at the moment of succession can therefore affect liquidity, ownership structures or the financing of a company.

The OECD points to precisely this issue in the context of inheritance taxes on family businesses and notes that many countries therefore provide special rules.

That is not an argument for making inheritances tax-free as a matter of principle.

It is an argument against treating business assets as if they were cash sitting in a vault.

Entrepreneurs create more than companies

The contribution of wealthy entrepreneurs does not end at the factory gate.

Swiss entrepreneur Heinrich Gebert endowed the Gebert Rüf Foundation with CHF 220 million. By the end of 2025, the foundation had invested CHF 292.4 million directly in projects. According to its own evaluations, 35 per cent of the completed projects examined led to the creation of a start-up.

In Germany, the Robert Bosch Stiftung invested around EUR 195 million in health, education and global issues in 2025 alone. Since its creation, it has provided more than EUR 2.7 billion for charitable work.

These examples are not substitutes for taxation.

They illustrate that private wealth can generate social value without first passing through a government budget.

A pluralistic society consists of more than the state and the individual.

Between them stand companies, foundations, associations, universities, philanthropists, investors and private initiatives.

It is precisely this diversity that limits power.

Economic success is not a moral failing

This is where the real dividing line in the debate lies.

One can view wealth primarily as a distribution problem.

Or one can first ask how that wealth was created and what it makes possible.

Of course, wealth generated through corruption, fraud or political privilege deserves no special protection.

But in a market economy, substantial wealth is often created because someone starts a company, takes risks, creates jobs, invests and remains an owner for decades.

To then place the result under moral suspicion sends a peculiar message to the next generation of entrepreneurs.

The state can tax. It cannot legislate entrepreneurship into existence.

A state can tax income.

It can tax wealth.

It can tax inheritances.

It can tighten rules and invent new taxes.

What it cannot create by law are risk-taking, trust, owner responsibility and an entrepreneurial tradition.

From a liberal perspective, this does not imply a state without taxes.

It implies a restrained state that understands that its own economic foundation is created outside the state.

Legal certainty.

Property rights.

Predictable taxation.

Competition.

And respect for economic success.

The most important question for sensible location policy is therefore not:

How much more can we take from successful people?

It is:

What must we do to ensure that people who create companies, invest capital and assume responsibility still want to invest here tomorrow?

Because when they leave, a country may first lose a taxpayer.

Then perhaps an investor.

Then a decision-making centre.

Later, a foundation.

And eventually an entire generation of entrepreneurs.

Only the first loss ever appears on the tax bill.

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Two No Votes Against Self-Restraint

70.15 per cent voted No to the neutrality initiative. 72.52 per cent voted No to the food initiative. Not a single canton voted in favour. That is a remarkably clear result.

The two proposals had little in common. And no one should claim that everyone who voted No did so for the same reasons.

Still, one common interpretation suggests itself: Switzerland twice rejected the idea that security can be created through rigid constitutional constraints.

Neutrality Requires Room for Manoeuvre

Neutrality does not mean standing still.

The neutrality initiative would have significantly restricted Switzerland’s scope for security cooperation. Cooperation with military or defence alliances would, in principle, only have been possible once an armed attack against Switzerland had taken place or was being prepared. Sanctions against belligerent states outside the UN framework would also have been heavily restricted.

That may sound consistent. But it would have come at the cost of flexibility.

If cooperation can only begin once the threat has already materialised, it begins too late.

Security is built beforehand. Through dialogue. Through exercises. Through partnerships. Through relationships that work before they are urgently needed.

The No vote was therefore not a rejection of neutrality. Neutrality remains. What was rejected was the attempt to lock its application into a much narrower constitutional framework.

And that matters.

Cyberattacks, geopolitical pressure and organised crime do not respect borders. A sovereign state must therefore be able to decide when, with whom and how it protects its interests.

Self-Sufficiency Is Not the Same as Security of Supply

The food initiative raised a similar question about what security actually means.

It aimed to raise Switzerland’s net self-sufficiency rate from around 46 per cent to at least 70 per cent within ten years.

More domestic production can strengthen security of supply. But that does not mean greater autarky automatically creates greater resilience.

Switzerland has limited agricultural land, a high population density and a deeply interconnected economy. Its food security therefore rests on several pillars: domestic production, imports and mandatory reserves.

That is not a weakness.

It is diversification.

Every risk manager knows the principle: resilience is not created by putting everything on one card. It comes from multiple sources of supply, reserves and alternatives.

A strong Swiss agricultural sector therefore remains essential to food security.

But so do reliable trading partners.

Sovereignty Means Being Able to Decide

That leads to the broader point.

Sovereignty does not mean having as little to do with others as possible. Sovereignty means retaining the ability to decide for yourself.

A country that voluntarily removes its future options does not automatically become more independent.

Switzerland therefore does not have to choose between independence and cooperation.

It can remain neutral and cooperate on security.

It can strengthen domestic agriculture and continue to trade internationally.

It can defend its own interests without isolating itself.

A small country at the heart of Europe is strongest when it remains independent in its decisions while staying reliably connected to others.

The double No vote of 27 September can therefore also be read in this way:

No to self-restraint.
Yes to room for manoeuvre.

Switzerland does not become more sovereign or more secure through less cooperation.

It does so by preserving the freedom to decide for itself whom it works with.

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Switzerland Needs to Trust Freedom Again

Switzerland is successful because it gives its citizens and businesses comparatively broad freedom. Not because the state directs particularly much.

Perhaps we should remind ourselves of that more often.

Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich August von Hayek and Frédéric Bastiat were separated by more than a century of economic history. Yet one conviction united them: society works better in the long run when people are free to make as many decisions as possible themselves and when the state focuses on setting reliable rules.

That may sound theoretical.

For Switzerland, it is highly practical.

Freedom starts with the recognition that no one possesses enough knowledge to centrally steer a complex economy.

Hayek described this problem as early as 1945. Economically relevant knowledge is not concentrated in one place. It is dispersed across millions of businesses, households and individual decisions. Prices coordinate this knowledge without any authority having to possess it in full.

An entrepreneur knows more about his customers than a public agency.

A craftsman knows more about his capacity than a ministry.

An investor knows more about his risk than a commission.

This does not mean that markets always produce perfect outcomes.

It means something else: government decision-makers do not possess perfect knowledge either.

Regulation should therefore not be judged by whether its intention is good. What matters is what consequences it actually produces.

This is where Bastiat becomes relevant.

His famous principle of “what is seen and what is not seen” may be more relevant today than ever. Political measures usually make their immediate benefits highly visible. Subsidies create visible winners. Support programmes finance visible projects. Regulation addresses visible risks.

What is less visible are the opportunity costs.

Which company was never founded?

Which investment never took place?

Which employee was never hired?

Which innovation was abandoned because permits, documentation requirements or regulatory risks became too burdensome?

Bastiat’s point was not that public spending is inherently useless. His point was that its costs must also be taken into account.

This is precisely where the debate becomes concrete for Switzerland.

The OECD continues to describe Switzerland as an exceptionally successful, open and market-oriented economy. At the same time, it notes that the administrative burden on companies is above the OECD average and that reducing bureaucracy could strengthen productivity and economic dynamism. State ownership also remains significant in parts of the Swiss economy.

SECO itself sees room for improvement. Monitoring published in 2026 showed that the number of regulatory obligations imposed on companies increased regularly between 2005 and 2025. At the same time, instruments have been introduced to reduce administrative burdens.

This is not a crisis.

But it is a warning signal.

Mises would probably have asked a simple question: do we automatically respond to every new problem with a new intervention?

His criticism of interventionism was not a rejection of the state as such. Mises also regarded rules protecting property and peaceful cooperation as necessary. His warning concerned a different dynamic: interventions alter incentives, decisions and prices. When new problems emerge as a result, the response can easily become yet another intervention.

That is why freedom requires institutional discipline.

Not every inequality requires a subsidy.

Not every economic risk requires a new rule.

Not every desired development requires government support.

And not every social problem has an economic policy solution.

The alternative, however, is not “state or no state”. That distinction is too simplistic.

A free economic order requires an effective rule of law, functioning courts, property rights, competition, accountability and rules against fraud and abuse of power.

Externalities, information failures or natural monopolies may also justify state intervention.

The decisive question is therefore not whether the state is allowed to act.

It is: where is state action genuinely necessary, and where are people better placed to decide for themselves?

For Switzerland, this question is particularly important.

Our prosperity is built on entrepreneurship, international trade, innovation, competition, federalism and a remarkably strong tradition of individual responsibility.

These institutions are not historical decoration.

They are an economic competitive advantage.

Perhaps Switzerland therefore does not need a new programme for every new problem.

Perhaps it needs the courage, more often, not to create one.

Fewer rules where existing rules are sufficient.

More competition where structures are protected.

Faster permits.

Simpler procedures.

More responsibility for those who also bear the consequences of their decisions.

That would not be a revolution.

Quite the opposite.

It would be distinctly Swiss.

And Mises, Hayek and Bastiat would probably recognise a shared idea in it:

Freedom is not the absence of order. Freedom is an order that leaves individuals as much room as possible to decide for themselves.

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